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  2Introduction 
 
It is clear that the production of education requires monetary resources. Yet, several studies (e.g. 
Hanushek, 1986, 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Betts, 2001) have repeatedly highlighted over the last two decades 
the fact that there is no mechanical relationship between the level of public spending and pupils' results. 
In this context, economists and other social scientists have come to consider that more attention should be 
paid to the organizational characteristics of schools, in particular whether it makes a difference that they 
are privately run or funded or directly governed by central or local public authority. Is there some (robust) 
evidence that students could gain/loose by transferring from a public to a private school? And if so, what 
is the magnitude of the differential? 
 
The study of existing education systems can provide part of the answer to this question. Indeed, in many 
countries around the world, production of education is far from being a public monopoly. It is thus not a 
real surprise that both private and public schools are represented in the latest OECD survey (on academic 
achievement used in this paper (OECD, 2002). We are here referring to the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA). This survey, carried out in 2000, is aimed at testing the competencies in 
Math, Science and Reading of representative samples of 15-year-old students across OECD and non-
OECD countries
1. The resulting data set is very rich and can be used to address many questions relevant 
to education policy, one of them being the presence and the magnitude of a private/public achievement 
differential.  
 
To avoid any confusion, the reader should take good note of the way private/public categories are defined 
by the OECD and also the logic underlying this classification. A school was first classified as either 
public or private according to whether a public agency or a private entity had the ultimate decision-
making power concerning its affairs. A school is public if the principal reported that it was managed 
directly or indirectly by a public education authority, government agency, or by a governing board 
appointed by government or elected by public franchise. A school is considered as private if the principal 
reported that it was managed directly or indirectly by a non-government organisation (e.g., a church, a 
trade union, business or another private institution).  
 
                                                 
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium (French-Speaking), Belgium (Dutch-Speaking), Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Hong Kong China, Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
  3But not all privately managed schools are privately funded as often assumed. In the Netherlands, and to a 
lesser extent in Belgium, Ireland, Spain, or Denmark, significant portions of the student/pupil population 
attend schools operated by non-profit private boards largely (up to 90%) funded by public money. The 
Catholic and Protestant churches for example have been very active in establishing private schools. The 
point is that they are now largely integrated into the public system via the public funding mechanism. 
This specificity should be accounted for in an analysis aimed at comparing the efficiency of various types 
of schools. A distinction needs to be made between government-dependent and independent private 
schools according to the degree of dependence on government funding.  
 
In the OECD survey school principals were asked to specify the percentage of the school’s total funding 
received in a typical school year from: government sources; student fees or school charges paid by 
parents; benefactors, donations, bequests, sponsorships or parental fund-raising and other sources. 
Schools were classified as government-dependent private if they received 50 per cent or more of their 
core funding from government agencies and independent private if they received less than 50 per cent of 
their core funding from government agencies.  
  
In brief, this means that in the rest of the paper we will try to assess the relative efficiency of tree types of 
schools: private government independent (less that 50% of public funding), private government-
dependent (more than 50% of public funding) and public schools. 
 
This paper is organized in 4 sections. Section 1 briefly exposes the econometric and conceptual 
framework of our empirical analysis; the problem at hand is formulated in the terms of the more general 
Evaluation Problem. Section 2 presents the international data set we use, while Section 3 contains the 
results of our empirical analysis that we confront to those of previous studies. The last section concludes 
and also discusses the potential causes of private/private-government-dependent/public effectiveness 
differentials. 
 
1. Estimation of Private School Effect: a special case of the ‘Evaluation Problem’ 
 
We are interested in measuring the effect of private (or private government-dependent) school attendance 
(our treatment
2 variable) on educational achievement as measured by a standardized test score.  This 
problem can be seen as a specific case of the more general ‘Evaluation Problem’ (e.g. Heckman, Lalonde 
                                                 
2 Note that, in the evaluation literature, ‘treatment’ conventionally refers to the individuals who participate in the “program” 
(here, it refers to experiencing a certain type of education). 
  4& Smith, 1999). We observe the outcomes of pupils who attend a private or a private government-
dependent school and the achievement of those who attend a public school. To know the ‘true’ effect of a 
certain type of school on a particular individual, we must compare the observed outcome with the 
outcome that would have resulted had that student not attended that type of school. However, only one 
outcome is actually observed. What would have resulted had the student not been ‘treated’ – the 
counterfactual -- cannot be observed. And this is precisely what gives rise to the Evaluation Problem. Yet, 
by making some assumptions, information on non-participants can be used to derive the counterfactual 
for participants. 
 
Before stating how this idea can be implemented, it is important to specify the parameters of interest 
when estimating treatment effects. Many types of estimates are mentioned in the literature (Heckman & 
Navarro, 2003; Heckman, Lalonde & Smith, 1999; Bryson, Dorsett & Purdon, 2002). The empirical 
analysis led in this paper will focus on two. First, the impact that private school attendance has on 
individuals who were actually treated – i.e., the average effect of treatment on the treated (hereafter ATT). 
Second, what effect private schooling would have on an individual drawn randomly from the population – 
i.e., the average treatment effect (ATE)? These two effects are identical if we assume homogeneous 
responses to treatment among individuals; should the responses be allowed to vary across individuals, 
ATT and ATE would differ.  
 
Of these two parameters, the ATT constitutes an obvious start, as it immediately makes sense for policy 
makers who may consider it as the most directly relevant. The first of their concerns is of course to 
determine whether the program has any impact. Another important concern is whether the expansion of a 
given program is worth considering (for instance, increasing the share of pupils attending a certain type of 
school). While ATT may provide answers to the question of the impact, ATE is needed to go further and 
assess the opportunity of a program’s expansion. For instance, if only individuals with the largest 
expected gains attend a private school, ATE will be smaller than ATT. A generalisation of the program 
may thus produce lower effect that the one highlighted by ATT. 
 
1.1. The standard regression common effect model 
 
Until recently, the standard way to estimate the effect of a treatment on educational outcomes with cross-
section data was to control for observable differences between the treated and the non-treated using 
parametric regression models. For example, Summers & Wolfe (1977) and Toma & Zimmer (2000), 
  5assume that student i’s achievement (Ai) in a given country can be explained by linear, common effect 
models of the form: 
 
Ai=Xi β
’+ δ PRIVi + γPRIVGDi + ε  (1.)  
 
where PRIV is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the ith student attended a private government 
independent school and PRIVGD another dummy capturing attendance of a private government-
dependent school. If the set of independent variables Xi perfectly controls for the other determinants of 
achievement (mainly the student’s background and other characteristics), then estimating Equation (1) 
with OLS yields unbiased estimates of the treatment effect. In this case, ATT and ATE are equivalent, 
since a homogeneous and constant response to the treatment is assumed. The rest of the paper focuses on 
the sensitivity of regression results to the relaxation this assumption. 
 
1.2. Propensity Score Matching:  
 
i) The basic idea 
 
A major drawback of the regression model exposed above is that it imposes a linear form on the outcome 
equation. The private or private government-dependent school effect is assumed to adequately captured 
by the constant coefficient of a dummy variable. But nor economic nor education theory provides 
justification for imposing a particular (here linear) relation between achievement and its determinants. 
This same is also true of the assumed distribution of the error term. Following Heckman & Navarro 
(2003) and others, we therefore complement our analysis with the non-parametric matching approach 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). 
 
The underlying principle consists of matching treatment with comparison units (i.e. pupils attending, 
respectively, private or private government-dependent and public schools) that are similar in terms of 
their observable characteristics. As stated by Bryson, Dorsett & Purdon (2002), this approach has an 
intuitive appeal but rests on a very strong assumption: that any selection on unobserved variables is 
trivial, in the sense that the latter do not affect outcomes in the absence of the treatment. This identifying 
assumption for matching, which is also the identifying assumption for the OLS regression, is known as 
the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). 
 
  6Under CIA estimators relying on matching techniques can yield unbiased estimates of the ATT. They 
allow the counterfactual outcome for the treatment group to be inferred, and, therefore, for any 
differences between the treated and non-treated to be attributed to the treatment. To make this approach 
credible, a very rich dataset is desirable since the evaluator needs to be confident that all the variables 
affecting outcome are observed. This said, some researchers (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002) conclude that 
propensity matching generally replicates experimental results reasonably well. 
 
Matching pupils directly on their vector of covariates would be infeasible, especially when the number of 
covariates to control is large. The number of ‘cells’ into which the data has to be divided would then 
augment exponentially. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest a clever way to overcome this problem. 
They demonstrate that matching can be done on a single-index variable, the propensity score, defined as 
pi =Pr(PRIVi = 1 | Xi). In others words, counterfactual is provided by an individual j attending a public 
school but characterized by similar propensity to participate pj. This considerably reduces the 
dimensionality problem, since the conditioning is done on a scalar rather than a vector. 
 
The propensity score, however, must verify the balancing property. This means that individuals with the 
same propensity score must have the same distribution of observed covariates. In other words, the 
function used to compute the propensity score should be such that individuals with a similar propensity to 
attend a private school display, on average, similar values of covariates.  
 
Moreover, when doing propensity score matching, it is possible that, for a particular individual in the 
treatment group, no match can be found (i.e. nobody in the non-treatment group has a propensity score 
that is ‘similar’ to that particular individual). This is known as the common support problem. ATT has 
then to be redefined as the mean treatment effect for those treated falling within the common support. 
This may play in favour of the matching technique. The overlap requirement across the treated and non-
treated, in a sense, avoids making questionable extrapolations outside common support, as all parametric 
methods do. However, enforcement of the common support can result in the loss of a sizeable proportion 
of the treated population. For these discarded individuals, the programme effect cannot be estimated. 
 
Even within the common support, the probability of observing two pupils with exactly the same 
propensity score (pi=pj) is in principle zero, since this index is a continuous variable. Various methods 
have been proposed to overcome this difficulty (Smith & Todd, 2000). One is to implement caliper/radius 
matching. Caliper matching is a variation of nearest neighbour matching that attempts to avoid “bad” 
matches (those for which pj is far from pi) by imposing a tolerance on the maximum distance ׀pi - pj׀ 
  7allowed. That is, a match for person i is selected only if ׀pi - pj׀ < ε, where ε (the caliper) is a pre-specified 
tolerance. Treated persons for whom no match can be found (within the caliper) are excluded from the 
analysis. Thus, caliper matching is the way we impose the common support condition
3. This matching 
algorithm is also labelled ‘radius’ as the counterfactual consists of the mean score of all the comparison 
group members within the caliper. 
 
Finally, to obtain ATE using propensity score matching it is necessary to repeat the exercise, simply by 
considering the (symmetric) case where treatment means attending a public school, and computing the 
average treatment on the untreated (ATU). This means using pupils attending private schools to estimate 
the counterfactual for those registered in public schools. ATE is a weighted average of ATT and ATU, 
where weights are relative frequency counts.  
 
ii) Propensity score matching and k-type treatments 
 
Yet, given the nature of our problem (comparing the effectiveness of three types of schools), the 
framework developed by Rosenbaum & Rubin for a two-type situation (treated vs. non-treated) needs to 
be generalized. Fortunately for us this has already been done by Lechner (2000) and applied in the 
context of labour market program evaluation by Sianesi (2001).  
 
Lecher (2000) and Sianesi (2001) assume a set of k different kinds of mutually exclusive treatments
4 be 
available to individual i. In the context of this paper the choice set of a student and his/her family in some 
countries
5 contains 2 types of private schools (private & private government-dependent) as well as a 
public school option. But in other countries it is the case that the set of choice is more limited, containing 
only two possibilities: a public school or one of the two types of private schools (private government-
dependent in the case of Belgium). In the latter case, the Lechner-Sianesi model simplifies and can be 
equated to the original propensity score matching model developed by Rosenbaum & Rubin. 
 
Interest lies in the causal average effect of a treatment relative to another treatment on achievement. A set 
of potential outcomes is correspondingly associated to each of the potential treatments: A0, A1,... Ak, with 
A,k denoting achievement for individual i receiving treatment k. Let T{0, 1, …, K} denote the actual 
                                                 
3 For other ways of enforcing Common Support see Smith & Todd (2000) 
 
5 Austria, France, Spain 
  8assignment to a specific treatment (i.e. attendance of a certain type of school), so that Ti=k if individual i 
attends type k school.  
 
In what follows, the focus will be on the pair-wise comparisons of the average effect of treatment k 
relative to treatment k’ conditional on assignment to treatment k, for all combinations of k and k’: 
 
E(Ak–Ak’|T=k) = E(Ak|T=k) – E(Ak’|T=k) for k, k’{0, 1, …, K}, kk’  (2.) 
 
The first term of equation (2) -- the average outcome following treatment k for individuals who have 
participated in k -- is observed in the data. But it is not the case of the counterfactuals of the type 
E(Ak’|T=k). Assuming CIA, matching on the set of covariate X using propensity score should deliver 
unbiased estimates of ATT.  But we are in a multi treatment context. Can propensity scores still be used 
to solve the dimensionality problem? Lechner (2000) demonstrates that they can. When interested in pair-
wise comparisons of the various treatments, the conditioning variable of minimal dimension which 
ensures the balancing of observables X in the two sub-populations of interest k and k’ is still given by a 
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For any pair of treatments k and k’, the average outcome experienced by the set of k’-participants – whose 
conditional propensity to participate in k is similar to that of k- participants  -- identifies the 
counterfactual outcome participants in k would have experienced, on average, had they taken treatment k’ 
instead. 
 
  92. Data set and estimation steps 
 
2.1. Data and variable categories 
 
The data we use to assess the impact of type of school on achievement is relatively unique and fairly 
recent. It comes from the 2000 OECD survey (the so-called PISA project, Program for International 
Student Assessment). This database contains math, science and reading test scores of students aged 15 
across 34 OECD and non-OECD countries. These students are nested within schools, potentially 
attending different grades in countries with grade repetition.  
 
Although math and science scores were available we retained only reading test scores and the 
corresponding data. The reason is simply that the sample size is about twice larger for the reading test, 
reflecting the initial choice by the PISA consortium that reading literacy should be the main domain of 
assessment. The reader should bear in mind that we normalized
6 the reading score variable (mean 0 and 
variance 1) such that all reported treatment effect estimates can be immediately interpreted as % of a 
standard deviation.  
 
We only selected countries for which the number of students sampled and attending private or private 
government-dependant school i) is superior or equal to 150 and ii) represents more than 1% of the total 
sample. This leads to a subset of 20 countries or regions containing AUSTRIA, French-Speaking Belgium 
(BEL_FR), Dutch-Speaking Belgium (BEL_D), BRAZIL, Czech Republic (CZ), DENMARK, 
FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, HUNGARY, IRELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, LUXEMBOURG, 
MEXICO, New Zealand (NZ), SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND and the UK
7. Justification for 
limiting ourselves to this list is twofold. First, it makes no sense, statistically speaking, to assess a private 
school effect in a particular country using test scores of just of few dozen students. Second, policy-makers 
who currently discuss the opportunity to expand the private sector (using vouchers for example) are 
interested in knowing whether private or private government-dependent schools make a difference when 
attended by a large (and heterogeneous) population. We are tempted to add that the second argument 
                                                 
6Normalisation to mean M and standard deviation S, simply transforming x to y with formula y= S*(x-E(x))/S(x) + M 
7 We excluded KOR due to important missing data frequency among the variables of interest. We also excluded POLAND and 
PORTUGAL because these countries only report results for reading. Although the Netherlands meet these two criteria we 
decided not to include them in the analysis, as the OECD indicates that “concerns with sampling outcomes and compliance 
problems with PISA standards resulted in recommendations to place constraints on the use of the data for (...) the Netherlands. 
(...)The Netherlands’ response rate was very low” (OECD, 2002). 
  10suggests paying more attention to countries for which the (sample) share of private education is large
8, as 
in Belgium or Ireland where more than 50% of secondary school students attend a private school. 
 
Table 1 below gives the students’ repartition between public, private and private government-dependent 
schools, by country. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In order to implement the techniques presented in Section 2 (OLS and Propensity Score Matching), we 
have built a data set that is extremely rich in terms of individual characteristics and family/socio-
economic background known to affect academic achievement (see Tables 2 &3 for summary statistics by 
country and type of school). We retained besides age in month (AGE), gender (GIRL), the highest degree 
of father (FISCED=1 if he completed some post-secondary degree, FISCED=0 otherwise), the 
immigration status of father (FATHIM=1 if father born outside country of test, FATHIM=0 otherwise), 
the highest socio-economic index of both parents (HISEI)
9. PISA also contains potential determinants of 
achievement that are rarely available: an index of cultural resources available at home (HEDRES)
10, two 
indexes of parental communication (CULTC
11 & SOCC
12), and index of family material wealth 
(WEALTH)
13, educational support (FAMSUP)
14 and two indexes reflecting the student’s cultural activities 
(CULTA)
15 and potential access to cultural goods (books...) (CULTP)
16. All these variables combined 
                                                 
 
9 The last variable is the result of the conversion of Isco-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations) into 
International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI). For further details see 
http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/hg/pisa/index.htm 
10 The PISA index of home educational resources was derived from students’ reports on the availability and number of the 
following items in their home: a dictionary, a quiet place to study... This PISA index – like all the others --  corresponds to the 
most likely value of an implicit/latent variable from an Item Response Model. 
11 The PISA index of cultural communication was derived from students’ reports on the frequency with which their parents (or 
guardians) engaged with them in: discussing political or social issues; discussing books, films or television programmes; and 
listening to classical music. 
12 The PISA index of social communication was derived from students’ reports on the frequency with which their parents (or 
guardians) engaged with them in the following activities: discussing how well they are doing at school; eating <the main 
meal> with them around a table; and spending time simply talking with them a times a month and several times a week.  
13 The PISA index of family wealth was derived from students’ reports on: (i) the availability in their home of a dishwasher, a 
room of their own, educational software, and a link to the Internet; and (ii) the number of cellular phones, televisions, 
computers, motor cars and bathrooms at home. 
14 The PISA index of family educational support was derived from students’ reports on how frequently the mother, father, or 
brothers and sisters worked with the student on what is regarded nationally as schoolwork. Scale scores are standardised Warm 
estimates where positive values indicate higher frequency and negative values indicate lower frequency of cultural activities 
during the year.  
15 The PISA index of student’s activities related to classical culture was derived from students’ reports on how often they had, 
during the preceding year: visited a museum or art gallery; attended an opera, ballet or classical symphony concert; or watched 
live theatre. Students responded to each statement on a four-point scale with: never or hardly ever, once or twice a year, about 
three or four times a year, and more than four times a year. 
  11provided one of the best background profiles ever made available to statisticians in the field of education, 
probably reducing the intensity of selection on individual unobserved characteristics ; in other words, 
legitimising the CIA assumption underlying both OLS and matching.  
 
Finally, private schools are identified by dummy variables (PRIV, PRIVFG) equal to 1 by contrast to the 
public schools for which these dummies equal 0. 
 
[Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here] 
 
We also try to account for potential peer effects
17, by including the average parental socio-economic 
index of the student' s schoolmates (PHISEI) in the list of covariates. We assume that the peer effect is 
better captured by the socio-economic mix of the peer group
18. We are fully aware that the proper 
estimation of the true contribution of peer effects is a methodological issue per se. In particular, Rivkin 
(2001) underlines that the composition of the peer group is liable to be endogenous. However, dealing 
with this problem would be beyond the scope of the present paper.  
 
2.2. Estimation steps 
 
We logically focus on the magnitude of the private/public and private government-dependent/public 
school differentials. We first measure gross differentials. We do so simply by comparing the mean values 
of reading test scores for each type of school.  
 
Using the different covariates potentially explaining academic results we then run the traditional OLS 
model to get a first estimate of the net private school effect i.e. accounting for socio-economic status or 
profile and peer endowments.  
 
The last and more consequent step is to implement the propensity score approach developed in section 1. 
The propensity score (pi) itself is estimated via a binomial (1 treatment case) or a multinomial (2 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 The PISA index of possessions related to classical culture in the family home was derived from students’ reports on the 
availability of the following items in their home: classical literature (examples were given), books of poetry and works of art 
(examples were given). 
Scale scores are standardised Warm estimates, where positive values indicate a greater number of cultural possessions while 
negative values indicate fewer cultural possessions in the student’s home. 
17 For examples of studies focusing on this issue see Coleman (1966), Jencks & Meyer (1987), Brueckner & Lee (1989), 
Bénabou (1996), Glewwe (1997), Vandenberghe (2002). 
18 The student’s own parental socio-economic index (HISEI) is thus excluded from the average.  
  12treatments case) logit models
19. Matching is based on the caliper/radius approach (Smith & Todd, 2000) 
which we implement using a software called PSMATCH2
20 and imposing that caliper=0.01. All standard 
errors were obtained by bootstrapping (50 iterations). 
 
                                                 
19 Both the binomial and the multinomial logit are estimated on: a constant plus the whole list of covariates, without interaction 
or higher order terms. 
20 developped for STATA 8 by E. Leuven & B. Sianesi, and available at 
http://econpapers.hhs.se/software/bocbocode/S432001.htm 
  133. Results and analysis 
 
In Tables 4 & 5 below, we present into great details the three types of results of interest: [1] the gross 
score differential between private, private government-dependent and public students, [2] the coefficient 
associated to the PRIV and PRIVGD dummy (δ, γ) in an OLS regression model, [3] the estimates of the 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) obtained via propensity score matching, using a radius 
algorithm and imposing common support (caliper=0.01). We also report the other estimates derived from 
our propensity score matching analysis:  the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU), and the 
average treatment effect (ATE). 
 
Tables 6 & 7 give detailed information about the performance of the match. Each cell contains the 
average standardised bias of the different covariates, before and after matching. For each covariate, the 
standard bias is computed as the absolute difference in means divided by the square root of the average of 
the two associated variances, and multiplied by 100 (Rosenbaum & Rubin. 1985). Standard bias thus 
expresses covariate imbalance in percent of (average) standard deviation. 
 
There is no clear reference against which to judge the performance of the match, but comparing the 
values of Tables 6 & 7 with those of other studies (Bryson, Dorsett & Purdon, 2002) suggests an adequate 
match. Exceptions are the UK and New-Zealand (Table 6) where, even after matching, characteristics of 
pupils attending private schools are still significantly different from those of the pupils in public schools. 
 
The effect of enforcing the common support requirement is shown in Tables 8 & 9. The overall result is 
that the condition does not lead to dramatic loss of observations when matching pupils attending private 
government-dependent schools to pupils in public schools. Even when computing ATE the percentage of 
no-match is generally well below 5%. This level is low and is therefore unlikely to affect the robustness 
of ATE. However, Table 8 shows that for some countries like New Zealand, Brazil and Switzerland, up to 
17% of students are dropped by imposing common support while estimating ATT. For these discarded 
students, the effect of private school attendance cannot be estimated.  
 
[Insert Tables 4 & 5 about here] 
 
  143.1. Effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) 
 
For observers and decision-makers, the first concern is of course to determine whether a particular 
treatment (here attending a type of schools) has any impact on achievement. In other words, they are 
interested by estimates of the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). Those that we report in 
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that school type can have a significant effect on reading scores. Compared with 
the size of estimates generally obtained in the education production function literature (Hanushek, 1986), 
these (positive and negative) effects can be considered as sizeable. 
 
More details results about ATT are essentially twofold.  
 
First, ignoring the specific results for each country and focussing on general trends, it turns out that 
private schools and private but government-dependent schools do not perform equally. While the general 
tendency is for private schools (Table 4) to perform less well than public schools (-10% to -50% of a 
standard deviation), it is the opposite that we observe for private government-dependent schools (Table 
5). The latter outperform public schools by +5 to +30% of a standard deviation, on average. 
 
The second result is that the relevant and accurate comparison must be carried out country by country. 
There is only one country where students attending private schools outperform those attending public 
schools: Brazil. A close look at Table 4 indicates that the former have an advantage in the range of +21 to 
+30% of a standard deviation.  
 
There is then a group of European countries (Table 5) where students attending private government-
dependent schools significantly outperform students in public schools: French-Speaking Belgium (from 
+22 to +30%), Dutch-Speaking Belgium (from +22 to +24%), France (from +10 to +13%), Ireland (from 
+9 to +11%) and Spain (from +5 to +7%).  
 
There is also the case of Denmark (Table 5) where private government-dependent schools appear slightly 
less efficient than public schools. Other examples of private schools (Table 4) that seem to perform 
significantly less than public ones are Switzerland (from -46 to -56%), Austria (from -26 to -34%), Japan 
(from -21 to -25%), Mexico (form -16 to -22 %) and France (from -10 to -13%).  
 
  153.2. Beyond ATT 
 
Another important concern for decision-markets is whether the expansion of a given program is worth 
considering; or instance, increasing the share of pupils attending a certain type of school. While ATT 
answers to the question of a program’s impact, ATE is needed to assess the opportunity of its expansion. 
Would schools earmarked by ATT estimates as more effective also benefit to those who do not currently 
participate? If so ATE should have the same sign as ATT. This seems to be the case almost everywhere
21. 
In other words, expanding the size of the private sector in Brazil would lift average achievement. The 
latter would also rise in Belgium, France, Ireland or Spain with a bigger private government-dependent 
sector. Expanding the public sector would make sense in Denmark or Japan. 
 
Another (complementary) issue is that of diminishing returns to scale. Is it for example the case that only 
individuals with the largest expected gains attend more effective private-government dependent schools 
in French-Speaking or Dutch-Speaking Belgium? If so ATE should be smaller than ATT. The last 
column of table 5 suggests that ATE is of the same magnitude as ATT. Thus, the currently observed 
advantage of the private-government sector would not erode in the case of expansion. And this pleads for 
expansion. 
 
Quite surprisingly, there are even cases compatible with the rising return assumption. In Spain or France 
ATE for private government-dependent schools is higher than ATT. This is also true of the private sector 
in Brazil or the public sector in Denmark
22 and maybe Japan. If true, these results further support the 
relevance of policy aimed at expanding these sectors. 
 
Signs of diminish returns are to be found in Ireland with private-government dependent schools for which 
ATE (+6%) is slightly lower that ATT (from +9 to +11%). Similarly, the advantage of public schools 
over private ones could be eroded by expansion in Mexico, Austria, France and maybe also Switzerland. 
 
[Insert Tables 6 & 7 about here] 
[Insert Tables 8 & 9 about here] 
 
                                                 
21 Mexican public sector being a possible exception. 
22 In the latter case, results reported in table 5 show that ATE is more negative than ATT, suggesting that the size of the private 
governement-dependent sector should be reduced to increase average achievement. 
  164. Conclusion and further comments 
 
Results presented here derive from the analysis of PISA reading literacy test scores with both regression 
(OLS) and non-parametric propensity score matching. They essentially suggest that private government-
dependent schools can have a significant positive effect on 15 year-olds' academic achievement. 
Regarding private independent schools, the conclusion is rather the opposite. And this conclusion is in 
line with other research paper using the same data, addressing the same issue, although with different 
methodology (Dronkers & Robert, 2003)
23. 
 
But it is worth commenting these results into more details as there are exceptions to the general rule 
enounced above. In Brazil, private schools outperform public schools, while in Denmark, public schools 
do slightly better than private government-dependent schools.  
 
In Belgium, France, Ireland and Spain, the effectiveness premium goes to the very large sector of private 
government-dependent schools. By contrast, Switzerland, Austria, Japan, Mexico and France are 
countries where private independent schools perform less well than public schools.  
 
Still, for many of the countries and configurations examined here we would rather conclude to the 
absence of systematic advantage for any of the three school types. 
 
Our results also support the view that expanding the size sectors that are more effective  -- be it private 
(like in Brazil) or private government-dependent (as in Belgium, France, or Spain) of public (as in 
Denmark) – should improve average achievement. 
 
Some questions remain unanswered however. If private government-dependent schools positive effects 
hold only for some countries, how can they be explained? And similarly how can one explain that in 
some other countries privately run schools seem to be less efficient than public ones? Two alternative, 
sometimes conflicting, interpretations coexist to explain private, private government-dependent vs. public 
effect. The first interpretation, which would be favoured by economists, is that the private and public 
dichotomy in fact points to regulation differences. This is the ‘organizational’ interpretation of 
achievement difference. Following this line of reasoning, private schools in Brazil, Belgium, France, 
                                                 
23 Dronkers & Robert pool all countries and estimate private/private government-dependent and public effects using a fixed-
random effect model. 
  17Ireland or Spain could possibly perform better because they are granted more autonomy. And maybe 
private or private government-dependent schools have no more autonomy than public ones in all the other 
countries. 
 
The problem with that interpretation is that is doesn't fit very well with our results. It is indeed hard to 
reconcile the 'more autonomy-more effectiveness assumption' with the poor performance of private 
schools in Switzerland or Austria, and – more importantly -- the fact that in the countries where both 
private and private government-dependent schools coexist, the latter – presumably less autonomous -- are 
more efficient than the former.  
 
This leads us to a second more cultural interpretation of private/public school differential suggested by 
McEwan (2000) and Dronkers & Roberts (2003). Rather than talking about ‘private schools’ effects, it 
might make more sense – at least in some countries like Ireland, Belgium, Spain or France -- to talk about 
‘religious’ school effect. Indeed, a majority of private government-dependent schools are, in fine, run by 
religion-affiliated boards (Mc Ewan refers to Catholic Schools in Latin America, Dronkers & Roberts to 
Protestant and Catholic Schools). According to this cultural interpretation, the better education received 
in private government-dependent schools could be explained by religious values. In fact, the main 
religions enhance values such as hard work, effort, obedience, discipline, and dedication to a task for both 
students and teachers (maybe also parents). This is a very seductive interpretation that tends to fit better to 
our results than the previous one. But it also has its limits. Results presented in this paper suggest indeed 
that private government-dependent schools in Germany for example do not outperform public ones. But it 
is an undisputable fact that most of private government-dependent schools in that country are religion-
affiliated. 
 
Further research is needed to explore these two categories of assumptions and maybe other ones. This 
means that we need more detailed data about the regulatory environment and management style of both 
public and private schools in countries in which these two types of school cohabit. And as regards private 
schools, following Mc Ewan's remarks, we would also need to distinguish private schools with a religious 
affiliation (catholic, protestant, ...), from those that are secular or simply for-profit. 
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AUSTRIA 253  240  4008  4501  0.06  0.05  0.89 
BEL_FR .  1800  766  2566  .  0.70  0.30 
BEL_D .  2900  814  3714  .  0.78  0.22 
BRAZIL 429  .  3527  3956  0.11  .  0.89 
CZ .  313  5003  5316  .  0.06  0.94 
DENMARK .  929  3082  4011  .  0.23  0.77 
FINLAND .  150  4714  4864  .  0.03  0.97 
FRANCE 321  581  3178  4080  0.08  0.14  0.78 
GERMANY .  188  4254  4442  .  0.04  0.96 
HUNGARY .  201  4500  4701  .  0.04  0.96 
IRELAND .  2279  1405  3684  .  0.62  0.38 
ITALY 190  .  4468  4658  0.04  .  0.96 
JAPAN 1513  .  3672  5185  0.29  .  0.71 
LUXEMBOURG .  373  2878  3251  .  0.11  0.89 
MEXICO 584  .  3521  4105  0.14  .  0.86 
NZ 152  .  3302  3454  0.04  .  0.96 
SPAIN 491  1705  3622  5818  0.08  0.29  0.62 
SWEDEN .  154  4262  4416  .  0.03  0.97 
SWITZERLAND 223  .  5416  5639  0.04  .  0.96 
UK 421  .  8255  8676  0.05  .  0.95 
 
Source: PISA (2000) 























































AUSTRIA                          PRIV 527.54  190.30 0.11 0.76 0.48 0.18 57.70 57.81 0.41 0.08 -0.22 -0.06 0.50 0.38
  PUB                       
                         
                       
                         
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                         
                       
       
                       
                         
                       
                         
                       
                         
                       
494.19  189.57 0.13 0.64 0.49 0.25 47.96 47.92 0.23 -0.21 -0.31 -0.02 0.03 -0.10
BRAZIL
 
PRIV 476.53  188.11 0.01 0.70 0.53 -0.32 58.03 57.96 -0.27 0.59 0.43 0.21 0.01 0.16
PUB 376.78  188.34 0.01 0.24 0.52 -1.62 39.63 39.49 -1.68 0.02 -0.04 0.27 -0.32 -0.54
FRANCE
 
PRIV 518.84  189.74 0.11 0.74 0.47 0.25 52.72 52.73 0.06 0.42 0.20 0.00 -0.15 -0.11
PUB  500.29  189.40 0.19  0.62  0.51 0.14  47.78  47.69  -0.17  0.27  0.16  0.05  -0.38  -0.33
ITALY
 
PRIV 515.26  188.56 0.02 0.67 0.58 0.35 52.75 52.66 0.49 0.37 0.80 -0.54 0.12 0.58
PUB 488.32  188.62 0.02 0.54
 
0.52 0.18 46.87 46.78 0.10 0.43 0.78 -0.57 0.00 0.35
JAPAN
 
PRIV 515.10  188.45 0.00 - 0.44 -0.02 52.60 53.27 -0.15 0.12 -0.22 -0.14 -0.63 -0.16
PUB 526.80  188.65 0.00 - 0.51 0.05 49.48 50.53 -0.12 0.09 -0.18 -0.09 -0.75 -0.29
MEXICO
 
PRIV 495.17  188.14 0.02 0.75 0.51 0.16 58.71 58.89 -0.10 0.39 0.29 0.18 0.51 0.11





PRIV  593.32  188.29 0.33 0.88  0.61 0.33  64.03  64.03  0.95 0.30  -0.02  0.21 0.38  0.38
PUB 524.97  188.40 0.28 0.64 0.49 -0.04 51.39 51.32 0.19 0.05 -0.30 0.27 -0.10 -0.25
SPAIN
 
PRIV 539.52  189.73 0.03 0.79 0.47 0.36 61.59 61.44 0.49 0.51 0.36 -0.01 0.49 0.70
PUB 478.78  189.45 0.04 0.36 0.50 0.14 41.18 41.16 -0.30 0.10 0.18 -0.11 -0.12 0.04
SWITZERLAND
 
PRIV 512.91 188.20 0.25 0.79 0.52 0.38 61.11 61.08 0.54 0.41 -0.03 0.19 0.45 0.45
PUB 494.38  188.15 0.27 0.59 0.49 0.28 48.11 48.16 0.01 -0.02 -0.25 -0.01 0.02 -0.15
UK
 
PRIV 609.15  187.68 0.23 0.88 0.42 0.21 64.76 64.78 0.90 0.56 0.13 -0.21 0.72 0.66
PUB 516.96  187.62 0.09 0.66 0.50 -0.06 49.55 49.46 0.32 -0.05 -0.03 0.17 -0.22 -0.25
Source: PISA (2000) 
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Table 3 – Summary statistics (mean), private government-dependent (PRIVGD) vs public schools (PUB) 





















































AUSTRIA                          PRIVGD532.98  189.09 0.16 0.73 0.63 0.30 54.53 54.57 0.35 0.03 -0.25 -0.06 0.57 0.29
  PUB  494.19  189.57 0.13                       
                         
                       
                         
                       
                         
                       
                         
 
                       
 
                        
 
                         
                       
                         
                       
                         
                       
                       
                       
                         
 
                         
                       
                       
 





501.66  188.49 0.27 0.70 0.51 0.17 51.66 51.70 -0.02 0.04 -0.15 -0.13 -0.07 -0.34





550.58  188.58 0.09 0.82 0.48 0.35 49.85 49.81 -0.09 -0.42 -0.08 -0.37 0.03 -0.31





503.93  190.07 0.05 0.92 0.72 0.09 47.73 47.73 -0.88 -0.19 0.19 0.04 0.58 0.26
PUB 496.48  188.82 0.05 0.92 0.52 0.10 48.75 48.70 -0.85 -0.14 0.28 0.11 0.62 0.19
DENMARK
 
PRIVGD499.76  188.78 0.10 0.74 0.51 -0.17 51.27 51.18 0.53 0.14 0.11 0.24 0.49 0.05
PUB  497.67  188.52 0.09  0.71  0.49  -0.23
 
  49.46  49.43  0.50  0.11  0.23  0.33  0.22  -0.17
FINLAND
 
PRIVGD553.09  187.35 0.09 0.63 0.53 0.02 54.27 54.34 0.02 0.19 -0.18 0.04 0.22 0.28
PUB  544.63  187.58 0.02  0.61  0.52  0.01  49.90  49.95  0.24  -0.02  -0.20  0.05  -0.17  0.11
FRANCE
 
PRIVGD494.69  189.77 0.25 0.56 0.50 0.15 45.31 44.91 -0.28 0.22 0.14 0.08 -0.35 -0.29





561.25  188.07 0.08 0.88 0.79 0.47 57.04 56.86 0.47 0.03 -0.17 -0.15 0.56 0.43





492.87  188.80 0.05 0.86 0.37 0.03 51.20 51.19 -0.78 0.34 0.43 0.10 0.95 0.42





539.19  188.34 0.06 0.50 0.57 -0.06 49.99 50.05 0.09 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 0.03 0.00





445.32  188.44 0.44 0.42 1.00 0.27 41.14 41.41 0.16 -0.26 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.15
PUB 453.40  188.28 0.38 0.51 0.44 0.32 45.29 45.33 0.35 -0.19 -0.22 -0.11 -0.16 -0.07
NETHERLANDS
 
PRIVGD544.54 187.33 0.11 0.53 0.50 0.39 52.09 51.97 0.19 -0.34 0.32 -0.12 -0.24 -0.39





509.08  189.68 0.04 0.50 0.53 0.28 47.79 47.82 -0.03 0.24 0.15 -0.10 0.14 0.31
PUB 478.78  189.45 0.04 0.36 0.50 0.14 41.18 41.16 -0.30 0.10 0.18 -0.11 -0.12 0.04
SWEDEN
 
PRIVGD529.62  188.50 0.29 0.79 0.57  -0.09 56.04 55.54 0.45 0.02 -0.06 0.26 0.46 0.40
PUB  514.84  188.67 0.15  0.71  0.49  0.04  50.44  50.43  0.66  -0.15  -0.04  0.27  -0.15  0.03
Source: PISA (2000) 
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Matching  Country 
                    ATE=ATT std ATT std ATU    std ATE std
AUSTRIA                      0.352 -0.340  ** (0.055) -0.264 ** (0.053) 0.069 (0.320) 0.051 (0.302)
BRAZIL        1.096  0.298 **  (0.055)  0.215[c]    (0.054) **   0.497 **  (0.155) 0.473 **  (0.144)
FRANCE          0.199  -0.132 ** (0.047)  -0.101 **  (0.049)  0.033   (0.063)  0.022   (0.061)
ITALY  0.297  -0.064     (0.063)  0.040     (0.058)  0.189 **  (0.066)  0.184 **  (0.065) 
JAPAN                  -0.134  -0.214 **  (0.040)  -0.249 ** (0.050) -0.293 ** (0.068) -0.278 ** (0.057)
MEXICO          0.833  -0.166 ** (0.048)  -0.223 **  (0.070)  0.333 **  (0.100)  0.259 **  (0.087)
NZ  0.643  0.024     (0.078)  0.029[u][c]    (0.152)  0.179   (0.170)  0.173   (0.164) 
SPAIN  0.707  -0.008     (0.055)  -0.064     (0.058)  -0.240   (0.203)  -0.225   (0.187) 
SWITZERLAND                     0.189 -0.563 ** (0.061) -0.467[c] ** (0.093) -0.133 (0.169)  -0.143 (0.165)
UK  0.917  0.019     (0.049)  -0.155[u]     (0.101)  0.404 *  (0.227)  0.378 *  (0.218) 
[u]: average standardised bias after matching >10%, available only for ATT 
[c]: more than 10% of individuals dropped by imposing common support 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 2.5% 
 
Table 5: Gross and Net differences between private government-dependent (PRIVGD) and public schools (PUB) 
Gross 
Diff. OLS 
Propensity Score  
Matching  Country 
                  ATE=ATT   std ATT std ATU   std ATE std
AUSTRIA  0.409  -0.072     (0.054)  0.016     (0.050)  0.144  **  (0.069)  0.137 *  (0.067) 
BEL_FR            0.478  0.225 **  (0.034)  0.301 **  (0.063) 0.252    (0.040) ** 0.286 **  (0.051)
BEL_D        0.675  0.237 **  (0.032)  0.219 **  (0.037)  ** 0.254    (0.037)  ** 0.227   (0.036)
CZ  0.079  0.052     (0.044)  0.063     (0.042)  0.095  **  (0.045)  0.093 **  (0.044) 
DENMARK                     0.021  -0.078 ** (0.034)  -0.066 * (0.033) -0.106 ** (0.038) -0.097 ** (0.036)
FINLAND  0.096  0.026     (0.075)  0.044     (0.096)  0.049    (0.103)  0.049   (0.103) 
FRANCE              -0.060  0.127 **  (0.037)  0.100 ** (0.044) 0.141 **  (0.044)  0.136 **  (0.043)
GERMANY  0.645  -0.038     (0.055)  0.049     (0.056)  0.358  **  (0.072)  0.345 **  (0.070) 
HUNGARY  0.116  0.016     (0.055)  0.054     (0.072)  -0.071    (0.077)  -0.066   (0.077) 
IRELAND              0.412  0.110 **  (0.035)  0.091 ** (0.039) 0.019   (0.040)  0.064 *  (0.032)
LUXEMBOURG  -0.078  0.048     (0.048)  -0.004     (0.064)  0.028    (0.050)  0.024   (0.045) 
SPAIN        0.353  0.070 **  (0.028)  0.055 **  (0.026)  ** 0.095    (0.032)  ** 0.083   (0.029)
SWEDEN  0.159  0.034     (0.076)  0.071     (0.085)  0.109    (0.093)  0.107   (0.092) 
* significant at 5% 
** significant at 2.5%  
Table 6: Balancing of covariates: average (absolute) standardised bias before and after propensity score 






AUSTRIA 34.52  2.21 
BRAZIL 69.85  4.57 
FRANCE 21.17  2.63 
ITALY 22.51  6.93 
JAPAN 17.60  3.46 
MEXICO 72.43  6.42 
NZ 55.74  15.69 
SPAIN 62.21  4.82 
SWITZERLAND 46.72  5.80 
UK 70.65  16.34 
Note: this table reports for each country and each topic, but only for ATT, the average (absolute) standardised bias of the 
different covariates. For a given covariate the standardised bias defines as the ratio between i) the (absolute value of the) 
difference between the treated and matched means  ii) the square root of the average of the sample variances of the two 
groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin. 1985). 
source: PISA (2000) 
 
Table 7: Balancing of covariates: average (absolute) standardised bias before and after propensity score 






AUSTRIA 25.92  3.91 
BEL_FR 19.50  6.18 
BEL_D 16.75  2.53 
CZ 12.72  1.46 
DENMARK 11.58  0.87 
FINLAND 19.74  6.54 
FRANCE 9.80  2.20 
GERMANY 34.23  5.29 
HUNGARY 13.34  2.87 
IRELAND 17.70  2.89 
LUXEMBOURG 27.33  4.05 
SPAIN 15.31  2.24 
SWEDEN 28.59  7.51 
Note: this table reports for each country and each topic, but only for ATT, the average (absolute) standardised bias of the 
different covariates. For a given covariate the standardised bias defines as the ratio between i) the (absolute value of the) 
difference between the treated and matched means  ii) the square root of the average of the sample variances of the two 
groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin. 1985). 
source: PISA (2000) 
 
 
  26Table 8 – Common support: % of the treated not matched to a control observation (caliper=0.01): private 
(PRIV) vs. public schools (PUB) 
Country ATT  ATU  ATE 
AUSTRIA 0.01  0.00  0.00 
BRAZIL  0.18 0.00  0.02 
FRANCE 0.00  0.00  0.00 
ITALY 0.01  0.00  0.00 
JAPAN 0.00  0.02  0.02 
MEXICO 0.04  0.00  0.01 
NZ  0.14 0.00  0.01 
SPAIN 0.00  0.00  0.00 
SWITZERLAND  0.17 0.00  0.01 
UK 0.00  0.00  0.00 
source: PISA (2000) 
 
Table 9 – Common support: % of the treated not matched to a control observation (caliper=0.01): private 
government-dependent (PRIVGD) vs. public schools (PUB) 
Country ATT  ATU  ATE 
AUSTRIA 0.00  0.00  0.00 
BEL_FR 0.02  0.00  0.02 
BEL_D 0.00  0.01  0.00 
CZ 0.00  0.00  0.00 
DENMARK 0.00  0.00  0.00 
FINLAND 0.01  0.00  0.00 
FRANCE 0.00  0.00  0.00 
GERMANY 0.00  0.00  0.00 
HUNGARY 0.00  0.00  0.00 
IRELAND 0.00  0.06  0.02 
LUXEMBOURG 0.00  0.09  0.08 
SPAIN 0.00  0.00  0.00 
SWEDEN 0.00  0.00  0.00 
source: PISA (2000) 
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